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A common view in economics and psychol-
ogy is that decision agents achieve their 
choices and express their respective prefer-
ences by computing probabilistic properties 
(probabilities and money) from a decision-
making context (e.g., von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1947; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992; Starmer, 2000). In this computational 
processing, the main psychological mecha-
nism requires that decision agents are able 
to integrate economic (contextual) attrib-
utes such as money and probabilities into 
subjective values; in other words people are 
able to construct and employ psycho-eco-
nomic scales. Subsequently, when making 
a choice, decision agents are supposed to 
perform tradeoffs between the computed 
outputs (psycho-economic variables such 
as expected values) and certain monetary 
alternatives (see Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
Starmer, 2000). Despite the dominance 
of descriptive approach to the decision-
making (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
theorists (Hertwig et al., 2004; Stewart 
et al., 2006) have recently argued for some-
what different psychological processing in 
decision-making, without computations 
(integration of attributes) and tradeoffs. 
In particular, a non-utilitarian structure 
of preferences for risk is proposed. In this 
approach, decision-making is accounted for 
by experience with sequential events, sim-
ple binary comparisons (based on context 
and memory), and a threshold mechanism 
(Hertwig et al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2006). 
However, recent research (Kusev et al., 
2009, 2011; Jones and Oaksford, 2011), 
in an effort to map the nature of human 
preferences, explored the role of decision-
making content (the influence of memory 
in precautionary decision-making – Kusev 
et al., 2009, and transactional content 
on temporal and probabilistic discount-
ing of costs – Jones and Oaksford, 2011). 
Specifically, we   distinguish the influence 
of decision-making content from that of 
decision-making context (the description 
of risk); we see the content of decision-
making as experiential (accumulative) 
cognitive storage system which represents 
(but not necessarily accurately) experienced 
events and their associate frequencies as 
these events occur over time. Accordingly, 
in this article we elaborate further on the 
interplay of   decision-making context and 
content, as well as potential “decision” 
biases as a result of sequential experience 
in decision-making.
The imporTance of decision 
conTenT and psychological 
processing
People’s behavior in the face of risk 
implies that they judge and weight the 
probability of risky events in character-
istic ways that deviate from normative 
theory. Nonetheless, both expected utility 
(EUT;  von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947) and prospect theory (PT; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992) share a common 
representational assumption: people’s 
risk preferences and decisions under risk 
and uncertainty are task-independent. In 
this opinion article we pursue an oppos-
ing idea that risky choices are affected by 
decision content, even when utilities and 
probabilities are known. In contrast with 
PT (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and 
experienced-based decision-making (e.g., 
Hertwig et al., 2004), we suggest that people 
do not have stable preferences (Kusev et al., 
2009, manuscript in preparation); instead, 
context, accessibility to content of decision-
making, task demand, and skills determine 
choices. Accordingly, we argue that any 
assumption about a particular behavioral 
pattern for risk as well as the assumption 
of a single type of processing (e.g., compu-
tational or non-computational processing 
in decision-making) is difficult to justify. 
Indeed, in decision-making, humans might 
be able to exhibit different patterns and use 
different types of processing [e.g., comput-
ing the probabilistic information from the 
context or sampling from memory (content 
of decision-making) and context].
Our position is that the particular com-
bination of contextual factors, accessibility 
to content, demands, and skills trigger a 
particular type of processing, which then 
results in preferences. For example, task rel-
evance has been demonstrated to influence 
processing style in risky choice. Task with 
high relevance result in the application of an 
analytic processing style, but the opposite is 
true for tasks with low personal relevance, 
leading to the application of a holistic pro-
cessing style (McElroy and Seta, 2003). 
We speculate that some of the differences 
between experience-based and description-
based decision-making reflect differences in 
psychological processing (e.g., computa-
tional and non-computational processing; 
holistic and analytical psychological pro-
cessing). Commonly, as in learning about 
decisions from experience, the risky events 
in the real world are experienced sequen-
tially and separated from the context pro-
vided by subsequent events in a temporally 
extended sequence. However, some risky 
events are not experienced individually over 
time, but are reviewed retrospectively and 
can also immediately be viewed holistically 
such that any overall pattern will be imme-
diately apparent – as with learning about 
decisions from descriptions. Nevertheless, 
in both situations decision-makers refer 
to exactly the same data points in order 
to make their choices (or express their 
risky preferences). In Kusev et al. (2009), 
the empirical results and probability-
weighting fittings indicated a failure of the 
descriptive invariance axiom of EUT. For 
risky choices, people overweighted small, 
medium-sized, and moderately large prob-
abilities: respondents exaggerated risks. 
It was concluded, that exaggerated risk 
is caused by the accessibility of events in 
memory (content of  decision-making): the 
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the decision-maker (including cognitive 
resources and motivation; see Kruglanski 
et al., 2007) and (d) presentation format of 
task material (for example probability for-
mat or frequency format; see Gigerenzer, 
2002) all influence people’s psychological 
processing and subsequent risky choices. 
Many studies that limitations of space 
prevent us from reviewing here have dem-
onstrated the effects of these components 
and their interaction on decision-making 
(e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002) and information-
processing style (e.g., McElroy and Seta, 
2003). Thus, risky choice is context- and 
content-dependent through the influence 
of specific characteristics of four compo-
nents in decision-making behavior and 
processing.
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quency estimates for the event categories, 
indicating that participants do not make 
frequency judgments by sampling their 
memory for individual items as implied 
by other accounts such as the availability 
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) 
and the availability process model (Hastie 
and Park, 1986).
The first-run effect could have particu-
larly important implications for people’s 
decision-making under risk in situations 
where experienced frequency of outcomes 
is the only basis for assessing likelihoods 
(e.g., experienced-based decision-making 
research; Hertwig et al., 2004). However, 
these studies did not require people to 
make explicit judgments of frequency – 
only to make decisions where experienced 
frequency of outcomes was an input to a 
risky decision. It is therefore worth con-
sidering also asking respondents in future 
decision-making studies to explicitly 
judge the experienced frequency of types 
of event experienced in sequences, or to 
make risky decisions where the judged like-
lihood of the experienced events is input 
for those decisions. Moreover, according 
to the foundation of economic theory, 
people have stable and coherent prefer-
ences that guide their choices between 
alternatives varying in risk and reward. 
In all their variations and formulations, 
UT (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947), and PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) share 
this assumption. This view, for stable pre-
dictable patterns of preferences for risk, 
is shared by experience-based decision 
research, which reports (in contrast to 
PT) that probability of recently sampled 
information is overweighted (Hertwig 
et al., 2004). Nonetheless, it is possible 
that people simultaneously both overes-
timate experience-based likelihoods but 
also underweight their impact on risky 
decisions. The possibility of this sort of 
dissociation has yet to be systematically 
examined (cf. Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993).
conclusion
In conclusion, going beyond our research 
examples of the role of accessibility and 
decision-making and sequence-influenced 
frequency judgment, our position is as fol-
lows. Characteristics of (a) the decision-
making context and (b) content (e.g., Kusev 
weighting   function varies as a function of 
the accessibility of events. This result sug-
gests that people’s experiences of events leak 
into decisions even when risk information 
is explicitly provided; variation in decision 
content produces variation in preferences 
for risk.
do experienced sequenTial 
paTTerns shape preferences?
It is difficult to imagine that our experi-
ences and associated memories do not 
shape our future choices. Indeed, the 
right question to ask is not whether this 
is plausible, but how and why preferences 
and judgments are shaped by experiences 
and their sequential pattern. Recent 
research on frequency judgments and 
memory (Kusev et al., 2011) demonstrates 
that participants do not make frequency 
judgments by sampling their memory for 
individual items; participants judged fre-
quencies relative to experienced sequential 
patterns (sequentially encountered stim-
ulus properties of the stimulus sequence 
configuration).
Traditionally, research in cognitive psy-
chology has argued that decision-makers 
are constrained by limitations of infor-
mation-processing and memory (Simon, 
1956), and hence have a propensity to 
avoid cognitive load. We argue that this, 
in turn, will encourage them to respond 
to “appropriate processing” informed by 
simple patterns (Kusev et al., 2011), deci-
sion-making content, and memory (e.g., 
Kusev et al., 2009; Jones and Oaksford, 
2011) – all psychological mechanisms 
that may account for people’s risky 
decision-making. In Kusev et al. (2011) 
a series of experiments studied relative-
frequency judgment of items drawn from 
two distinct categories. The experiments 
showed that judged frequencies of catego-
ries of sequentially encountered stimuli 
are affected by properties of the experi-
enced sequences, through the first-run 
effect, whereby people overestimate the 
frequency of a given category when that 
category was the first repeated category to 
occur in the sequence. We also found dis-
sociation between judgments and recall; 
given two types of event, respondents may 
judge one type more likely than the other 
and yet recall more instances of the latter. 
Specifically, the distribution of recalled 
items does not correspond to the fre-
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